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Richard B. Freeman, Robert Topel, and 
Birgitta Swedenborg 
This is a study of an economy in transition and in trouble. Not an Eastern or a 
Central European economy seeking the path to capitalism, but a Western econ- 
omy once heralded as offering a “third way” of operating a capitalist system. 
An economy that relies heavily on the state, unions, and employer associations; 
an economy that equalizes market outcomes with massive welfare state redis- 
tributions; and an economy that many regarded as the model welfare state. The 
troubles that have befallen  that economy and the effort to reform its welfare 
state are well worth understanding. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Sweden’s economic performance and effort to gain 
economic equality for its citizens won worldwide plaudits. Many heralded the 
“Swedish model” as offering a more rational and humane form of capitalism 
than more market-driven  economies. In the  1970s and  1980s, Swedish eco- 
nomic performance slackened-by  how much and why are questions open to 
debate. In the  1990s, Sweden’s economy  plunged  into crisis.  Huge budget 
deficits created a fiscal crisis in 1993, threatening the funding of welfare state 
redistributions  and  benefits.  Unemployment,  which  had  for  decades  been 
lower than in other developed economies, soared to levels not seen since the 
1930s. 
Sweden’s position as a role model for other countries has been severely, if 
not irretrievably, tarnished. But rather than turning our backs on the Swedish 
model and studying more fashionable ones, we believe that there are important 
insights to be gained from a serious evaluation  of the  Swedish experience. 
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These insights should be valuable to other countries as they consider the bene- 
fits and costs, the risks and problems, of  welfare state solutions to economic 
and social problems. 
How serious are Sweden’s economic troubles? Have critics of  the welfare 
state exaggerated those troubles? Are the troubles related to the welfare state? 
Can Sweden restore its economic health and preserve the successes of its wel- 
fare state? What are the limits and excesses of the Swedish welfare state? What 
can observers in other countries learn from Sweden’s experience of having the 
government play a large role in markets? 
These  questions  motivate  this  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research 
(NBER)-Center  for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) project. They are not 
the questions that outsiders to the Swedish scene have previously asked. This 
is because, until the late 1980s, early 1990s, Sweden seemingly had no greater 
economic problems than many other Western countries. For example, in 1985- 
86, American economists associated with the Brookings Institution examined 
the Swedish economy (Bosworth and Rivlin, 1987). While these economists 
noted areas in which Sweden, like the United States in the 1980s, consumed 
beyond its productive means, overall they were impressed by Sweden’s living 
standards and absence of poverty and by how well the economy worked despite 
high taxes, a huge welfare state, limited wage differentials, and diverse inter- 
ventions in markets. In 1986, Mancur Olson asked why Sweden did well for 
so long despite its extensive transfer system. He concluded  that part of  the 
answer lay in the competitive traded goods sector and part in high unionization, 
which internalized potential externalities from special interest negotiations in 
the labor market (Olson 1990). Other outsiders have given even more positive 
readings of the Swedish system (Layard 1991; Gibson and Hall 1993). 
Swedish economists have been more critical. Many of them have criticized 
the extent of the welfare state, the inflationary tendencies of centralized collec- 
tive bargaining, and other features that differentiated Sweden from the normal 
capitalist economy (Lindbeck  1993; Lundberg  1985; Bergstrom  1992; SNS 
Economic Policy Group 1992). The economic crisis of the 1990s made these 
criticisms more salient. Something went drastically wrong with the Swedish 
economy-be  it the features these analysts stress or something else. In 1992, 
the Swedish government asked a group of Swedish economists, headed by As- 
sar Lindbeck, to consider the best way to turn the economic situation around 
(Lindbeck et al. 1994). Many Swedish social scientists contributed background 
studies for this project, which yielded  113 recommendations for changes in 
policies. 
The NBER-SNS  project on Sweden enlisted ten American economists- 
and an equal number of Swedish economists-to  study various aspects of the 
Swedish economy and welfare state. What is the value of  having American 
economists look at the Swedish economy in 1993-94, so few years after publi- 
cation of the Brookings study and so shortly after the Lindbeck commission’s 3  Introduction 
proposals? What insights might outsiders contribute to understanding Sweden’s 
problems and possible path to recovery? 
One thing outsiders bring is their ignorance of  the details of  the Swedish 
economy. This has virtues and dangers. Ignorance of details can make it easier 
to see problems in a broad perspective-the  forest instead of the trees-and 
to question conventional wisdom. A case in point is Swedish thinking on ex- 
change rates. In the fall of 1992, supported by all political parties, union feder- 
ations, employer groups, bankers, and most economists, the Swedish govern- 
ment committed the nation to defend the krona’s fixed exchange rate, almost 
as a matter of patriotic duty. Impressed by the failure of similar policies else- 
where (e.g., the fall in the British  pound, the Italian  lira, and the Mexican 
peso), the historical record of devaluations in Sweden, and the American expe- 
rience  with  floating  exchange  rates,  outsiders questioned  the rationality  of 
Sweden’s commitment. So did currency speculators, who benefited at the ex- 
pense of Swedish taxpayers when the krona was subsequently devalued again. 
Outsiders can also offer an independent assessment of debates within Swe- 
den about the country’s economic troubles. For example, some Swedish ana- 
lysts argue that Sweden has been in substantial relative decline for a long pe- 
riod  of  time.  They  are  alarmed  by  Sweden’s drop from  near  the  top  of 
international  rankings of  per  capita income  (SNS Economic  Policy  Group 
1992; Henrekson, Jonung, and Stymne  1996; Lindbeck  1993). Others claim 
that these comparisons exaggerate the extent of Sweden’s long-term problems 
and fail to show that these problems were caused by the welfare state (Korpi 
1996). In principle, outsiders can offer a more objective view. 
There may be a particular  virtue in having American economists examine 
the Swedish scene. In  terms of  the role of  government in economic activity, 
the United States and Sweden stand at opposite ends of the capitalist spectrum. 
The United States is the exemplar of unregulated labor markets, highly com- 
petitive  product  markets,  and  a  small welfare  state.  To  the extent  that  the 
United  States  and  Sweden  have  similar economic  problems,  analyses that 
blame Sweden’s problems on its welfare state or interventions in the economy 
may  be misplaced. To the extent that Sweden moves to a more market-run 
economy, the American experience can offer some guidance. The poor U.S. 
record in the area of Sweden’s greatest success, reduction of poverty, highlights 
the distributional problems that Sweden will want to avoid as it reforms the 
welfare state and gives greater play to market forces throughout its economy. 
Conversely, the United States and other countries that are confronted with the 
problem of rising poverty might learn from Sweden’s apparent success in this 
area. 
The great risk of an outsider’s evaluation is that an outsider will get it all 
wrong. American economists lack the institutional knowledge of how things 
work in Sweden that natives gain from daily experience. Living in a society 
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might miss. Moreover, outsiders’ analyses can be colored by the analysts’ own 
values. If Americans simply care less about equality than Swedes do-say,  for 
cultural reasons-their  analyses may undervalue the virtues of redistributive 
policies. For these reasons  and others, each paper in our project  paired  the 
talents of Swedish and American economists. 
Did the project succeed in bringing outsiders’ insights to bear on Swedish 
problems? Readers of this volume will make up their own minds, but one indi- 
cator of how the project fared can be garnered from the Swedish reaction. In 
1995, a summary version of the volume was published in Swedish, and a joint 
SNS-NBER conference was held in Stockholm to discuss the results.  Given 
the topic and Sweden’s economic woes, the volume and conference received 
considerable attention. Most Swedish commentators took the study as a valu- 
able perspective on the Swedish welfare state, irrespective of whether they 
agreed or disagreed with specific conclusions. But some took  offense. One 
headline labeled the Americans as “cowboy economists,” whose guns shot only 
blanks at Sweden’s wonderful welfare system. Another newspaper likened the 
American team to a gang of creepy Wall Street financiers, opposed to any form 
of egalitarian policies. But these were far from the norm. For the most part, 
commentators reported that the findings (which  we describe shortly) devel- 
oped new arguments or  evidence that illuminated Sweden’s problems in in- 
sightful ways. The project advanced the Swedish debate by doing exactly what 
we hoped it would do: allowing Swedes to see themselves through outsiders’ 
eyes. 
This volume is designed for a broader audience than Swedes. It is meant for 
policy analysts, economists, and other social scientists in the United States, in 
the European Union, and elsewhere in the world where people are confronted 
with questions about welfare states and the role of government in enhancing 
economic well-being. Why should non-Swedes be interested in Sweden’s trou- 
bles and its efforts to reform the welfare state? When Sweden was the idealized 
“third  way,”  some analysts critical of more normal market economies were 
deeply interested in Sweden’s experiences. They  saw Sweden as offering a 
model for other countries to follow. Now that Sweden has run into economic 
trouble, many of those analysts look elsewhere for a successful alternative to 
more market-driven economies. Sweden-where’s  that? Why study a welfare 
state in trouble? Let’s look only at successes. Book my ticket to Frankfurt- 
no, make that Berlin. 
There are lessons from Sweden’s economic problems that should be illumi- 
nating to those who admired the past successes of  the welfare state. By the 
same token, those who tend to be critical of activist governments and of redis- 
tributive policies may learn from Sweden’s successes. Sweden’s effective elimi- 
nation of poverty is a unique social achievement that deserves attention. How 
did Sweden succeed where others had failed? What are the costs of this suc- 
cess, and will reform threaten the basis for Swedish equality? The current eco- 
nomic crisis and the difficulties  of  reforming the welfare state also deserve 5  Introduction 
attention,  particularly  from citizens in other European  countries with large 
welfare systems. Sweden’s commitment to egalitarian ideals and the welfare 
state makes it an extreme case among advanced capitalist countries. But we 
may  learn more about the pitfalls  facing all countries from an extreme and 
distinctive case than from modest variants. 
Sweden’s Economic Troubles 
Four issues are involved in judging Sweden’s economic problems: (1) how 
well or poorly the economy performed prior to the 1990s crisis, from, say, the 
1950s through  1989; (2) the magnitude and nature of the 1990s crisis; (3) the 
relation  of  welfare state institutions to the  1990s crisis; and (4) the conse- 
quences of the crisis for Sweden’s ability to restore living standards and main- 
tain its egalitarian goals. 
The precrisis record has been the subject of  controversy. On one side are 
analysts who  stress  the  drop  in  Sweden’s per  capita income  in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) units relative to other OECD countries. These observers 
also stress the relatively slow growth rate that brought Sweden to its current 
income level. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1994, table 1370), 
Sweden’s GDP per capita was the third highest of OECD countries in 1970 in 
purchasing power parity units. By  1990, it had slipped to eighth place, and, 
with the onset of economic crisis, it fell to seventeenth place in  1993 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1995, table 1374).  On the other side are those who argue 
that these comparisons exaggerate the country’s long-term economic difficult- 
ies. They point out that critics’ conclusions are sensitive to the countries that 
are used as bases for comparisons, the years analyzed, and the measure of 
income utilized. The decline in Sweden’s relative position is unarguable, how- 
ever. In 1970, Sweden’s GDP per capita was 8 percent above the OECD aver- 
age; in  1990, it was  2 percent  below  and,  in  1993, 12 percent  below  the 
OECD average.’ 
Cross-country comparisons of living standards and growth rates are always 
difficult. On the measurement side, data used for cross-country comparisons 
are imperfect. National income statisticians have problems measuring the out- 
put of the public and service sectors, and they do not include household pro- 
duction as a component of income. These problems mar comparisons between 
countries like Sweden-which  has a large public  sector and sharply  rising 
female labor force participation-and,  say, Germany, which has a smaller pub- 
lic sector and relatively low female labor force participation. Further, exchange 
rates are inadequate for transforming incomes in one country into those  in 
another in order to compare living standards. These rates fail to reflect differ- 
ences in costs of living. Using exchange rates, for instance, Switzerland had a 
1. Because Mexico is counted with the OECD in 1993 statistics but is not counted as an OECD 
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GDP per capita that was 42 percent above that in the United States in  1993. 
But the costs of nearly all goods and services in Switzerland were markedly 
above those in the United States at the going exchange rate, with the result that 
“true” living standards in Switzerland were not higher than those in the United 
States. Purchasing power parity estimates of the value of currencies provide an 
alternative way to transform national output into comparable units. Using these 
estimates, for example, Switzerland’s GDP per capita was 5 percent lower than 
that of the United States in 1993. But estimated PPPs are also imperfect. For 
some countries, the 1990 OECD purchasing power parity GDP estimates differ 
from the comparable 1985 estimates in  ways  that go beyond differences in 
measured growth of real GDP. Still, income comparisons adjusted for PPP are 
superior to those based on exchange rates, which fluctuate wildly and remain 
out of line with living standards for years on end. 
On the conceptual side, the extent to which other countries’ experiences 
provide a valid counterfactual for a particular country such as Sweden is debat- 
able. Indeed, some of the argument over Sweden’s comparative record concerns 
which countries constitute the “right” comparison group. Ought that group to 
include Portugal or Spain or Turkey, or should it be limited to the OECD coun- 
tries with the highest income per capita? Another conceptual problem relates 
to the inferences that one can legitimately draw about the effects of  policies 
from broadly  based country comparisons. If  Sweden does more poorly in 
growth than countries with smaller welfare states, does this mean that the wel- 
fare state has reduced its growth rate? Perhaps, but then how does one square 
that with the fact that the United States has grown less rapidly than countries 
with larger welfare states? Many things differ among OECD countries beyond 
welfare state policies or any other specific economic program or practice. To 
assess the effects of  those or other policies requires more than crude cross- 
country comparisons. Absent analyses of how specific programs and policies 
affect economic outcomes in  Sweden itself, and  simply informed by  what 
other economies do in the same area, we would not be prepared to make any 
definitive statements about the cause of  Swedish economic problems, much 
less about the possible effects of  policy reforms. That is the type of analysis 
this project seeks to provide. 
Problems with cross-country comparisons notwithstanding, such compari- 
sons are still relevant to assessing Sweden’s economic situation or that of any 
other particular country. They set the stage for detailed analyses of policies and 
programs by delineating what is unique to a particular country, in terms of both 
economic performance and economic institutions. They give a sense of  the 
range of  possible alternatives available to a country and can suggest clues to 
what may be working well or poorly. 
The Pre- 1990s Period 
Measured against comparable OECD countries, Sweden’s pre- 1990 eco- 
nomic performance is mixed. Productivity growth, the investment share of 7  Introduction 
GDP, and some other indicators were comparatively weak over the period dur- 
ing which the welfare state expanded. But the record is not so weak as to make 
an overwhelming case that the welfare state was a drag on economic growth in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Here are some indicators: 
1. In 1970, Sweden’s GDP per capita was 78 percent of that of the United 
States, which placed it third among OECD countries. By 1989, Sweden’s posi- 
tion relative to the United States was essentially unchanged (77 percent), but 
it had  fallen behind  Canada  and  Germany and was  approximately  tied  by 
France and Japan. By  1993, Sweden had dropped well down in the rankings, 
being surpassed by France and Japan and such other countries as Austria, Italy, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The long-term trend after 1970 
was that the highest-income countries grew more slowly than did low-income 
countries in the OECD. This can be illustrated by comparing the incomes of 
the four richest and four poorest OECD countries over time. In 1970, the ratio 
of the per capita GDP for the four richest countries to the per capita income of 
the four poorest was 1.55. This ratio had fallen to 1.27 by  1989. This means 
that the decline in the position of  Sweden relative to the full set of countries 
through that period reflects a general compression in incomes across countries 
rather than something unique to Sweden. But the ensuing decline of Sweden 
to a position far below that of other OECD countries cannot be so explained; 
the income compression  story is one of  poorer  countries catching up with 
richer ones, not of richer countries toppling in the per capita income tables. 
2. Sweden’s GDP per capita in 1989 reflects well on the productivity of the 
Swedish workforce. Given its lengthy vacations, holidays, generous sick and 
parental leave programs, and extensive part-time work, Swedish workers put 
in many fewer hours than American workers. Measured by  output per hour 
worked in 1989, Swedish productivity was approximately 83 percent ofAmeri- 
can productivity. In addition, in 1989, the average Swedish worker had eleven 
years of  schooling, whereas  the average American  worker had thirteen-a 
difference that goes a long way toward explaining the lower productivity per 
hour. 
3. In 1990, Sweden was ranked sixth on the basis of various indicators of 
competitiveness in the International Institute for Management Development- 
World Economic Forum’s World Competitiveness Report. The only European 
country that ranked higher was Germany. Measured by use of industrial robots, 
or information technology, or patents, Sweden rates high among OECD coun- 
tries. Measured by various indicators of the efficacy of its markets, the country 
rates a bit above the middle of the pack. In the Competitiveness Report, execu- 
tives rated Sweden low in the role of the state in the economy. 
4.  Data on consumption of  major household capital items-washing  ma- 
chines, VCRs, telephones, and so on-in  nine advanced OECD countries show 
that Sweden has not been a laggard as use of these goods has proliferated. It 
ranks high in consumption of some of these modem goods and lower in others, 
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consumption, the position of  the country with regard to these private goods 
confirms that Swedish living standards were among the best in the world at the 
outset of  the  1990s. In part, of  course, a high ranking in household capital 
goods reflects the past high position of Sweden in the OECD rankings of coun- 
tries by GDP per capita: it takes a long time before changes in income levels 
show up in changes in consumption of major capital items. 
A more negative picture is, however, shown in some other indicators: 
5. The rates of growth of labor productivity and total factor productivity in 
the business sector for 1960-73  and 1973-89 put Sweden in the bottom tier of 
the growth table in both periods, along with Switzerland, the United States, 
and the other English-speaking countries (Australia, New  Zealand, Canada, 
the United Kingdom). 
6. Swedish outlays on government programs, which were reasonably “nor- 
mal” until the 1970s, have increased more rapidly than in other OECD coun- 
tries. Government expenditures averaged 35  percent of  GDP in the  1960s. 
After that, they increased more rapidly than in other OECD countries, reaching 
an average of 63 percent in the 198Os, much higher than in other OECD coun- 
tries. The 1990s crisis pushed government expenditures to about 70 percent 
of GDP. 
7.  Sweden’s record in investment compared to other advanced OECD coun- 
tries has been modestly below average. The country’s capitflabor ratio, cor- 
rected for the high price of investment goods in Sweden, has fallen relative to 
many advanced competitors. 
8. Sweden has had a greater rate of price and wage inflation than the United 
States or most other OECD countries and has consequently devalued its cur- 
rency at fairly regular intervals. This belies the advantages of  centralized or 
coordinating wage setting in controlling inflation, which analysts once argued 
was one of the benefits of “neocorporatist” systems such as Sweden’s. 
In short, from the 1970s through 1990, the Swedish economy showed weak- 
nesses. But most other advanced economies also had problems in the era fol- 
lowing the oil price shock, albeit of differing kinds. The United States experi- 
enced a 20 percent fall in the real earnings of less-educated young men and a 
massive rise in inequality. Most European Union countries developed high 
rates of  long-term unemployment. Looking at the pre-1990s crisis data, we 
appreciate how different analysts, focusing on different contrasts or years or 
variables, can come down more, or less, harshly on the nation’s economic per- 
formance. There is no smoking gun in the aggregate data; rather, what we have 
is a “fuzzy” record of general economic weakness, whose causes are not trans- 
parent. But the 1990s downturn in Sweden’s economy was so severe as to cast 
a pall on the country’s earlier growth performance and on the more optimistic 
readings of that performance. 
Veering into a Ditch: The 1990s Crisis 
From 1990 to 1994, Sweden experienced an extraordinary economic crisis. 
The contraction of the Swedish economy over this period exceeds the problems 9  Introduction 
of  any other developed country (save for Finland, owing in large part to the 
collapse of the Soviet market): 
1. In terms of output, the Swedish economy went into a major tailspin from 
1990 through 1993. GDP fell each year, for a cumulative drop of some 5 per- 
cent. Industrial production fell by  8 percent, and retail sales dropped by  13 
percent. These changes occurred in the absence of a worldwide recession. 
2.  Gross capital formation fell by nearly one-third, with the largest contrac- 
tion occurring in residential construction. 
3.  Employment dropped by over 12 percent, with declines in the number of 
persons working in the public sector as well as in the private sector. Hours 
worked in mining and manufacturing fell by  23 percent between  1990 and 
1993. The country’s exemplary record in controlling unemployment collapsed. 
In late 1993, aggregate unemployment stood at 9.3 percent; the rate of jobless- 
ness (which includes persons on labor board programs for employment train- 
ing, relief works, youth measures, and so on but not measures for the handi- 
capped) reached over 14 percent. The youth unemployment rate reached 21.4 
percent! 
4.  The central government’s financial balance deteriorated sharply, and the 
deficit/GDP ratio rose to 13 percent in 1993! 
The depth of the crisis exceeded the prognostications of the experts. In 1992, 
SNS analysts (SNS Economic Policy Group 1992, table l), who were among 
the most pessimistic, anticipated that GDP would fall by 2.0 percent in 1991 
and by  1.5 percent in 1992 and then rise in  1993 by 1.5 percent, for a cumula- 
tive drop of  about 2.0 percent. They expected unemployment at the end of 
1993 to reach 4.5 percent. The OECD economic survey team did no better: a 
projected cumulated decline in GDP of  0.6  percent, with an unemployment 
rate of 5.2 percent for 1993. 
The ditch into which the Swedish economy fell was a steep one-with  some 
of the characteristics that the economic Cassandras had predicted would be the 
result of an excessive welfare state. 
Diagnosing the Crisis 
How one interprets the crisis experience in  Sweden is critical to how one 
assesses the longer-term Swedish economic record. If  the crisis was “just” a 
cyclic problem exacerbated by bad shocks, from which the economy rapidly 
bounced back, the pre- 1990s experience would continue to look like a mixed 
bag, with some symptoms of economic troubles but nothing definitive to show 
that the society had truly run aground. If the crisis is a more structural break, 
the economic woes of Sweden are more serious and better attributed to funda- 
mental economic problems than a severe cyclic downturn. 
We find a pure “bad cyclic shocks” reading of the 1990s crisis implausible. 
We  would be  shocked  (as economists are,  sadly, often  shocked  by  future 
events) if the economy grew sufficiently rapidly to bring GDP to its precrisis 
levels in short order, much less to raise GDP per capita to the level that it would 
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the 1980s.  The highest per capita growth rate that Sweden attained in the 1980s 
was 3.9 percent (1984). It would require two years’ growth at that high rate to 
bring Swedish GDP from its 1993 level to its  1990 level. It would require 
another four years to bring it to the level that even the modest 2 percent growth 
rate of the 1980s would have created through the 1990s. In fact, in 1996 Swe- 
den was back to its 1990 level of GDP. Thus, rather than a quick recovery, the 
economic loss from the 1990s crisis cost the country approximately six years 
of economic growth. This was a major disaster for the Swedish economy and 
welfare state. 
We identify three (not necessarily exclusive) hypotheses as potential expla- 
nations of the disaster. The first is that it was a symptom of long-run economic 
deficiencies that, for whatever reason, took their toll suddenly in the  1990s 
rather than more gradually over time. Lindbeck et al. (1994, 209) refer to this 
as systems  failures:  “The  most  obvious systems  failures  in  the  economic 
sphere are perhaps the high public spending, overly-generous social security, 
wide marginal tax wedges, low private-including  household-saving,  de- 
tailed regulations and cartelization in various markets, lax anticartel legisla- 
tion, and an inflation-prone system of wage formation.” This explanation posits 
that underlying structural problems made the Swedish economy susceptible to 
a major downturn, just as some of the diverse problems of the 1920s presum- 
ably made various economies susceptible to the  1930s downturn. To accept 
this hypothesis, we need both a model and supporting evidence showing that 
cumulated problems are likely to show up not only in gradual erosion but also 
in a sharp and sudden drop. It is possible that this is a correct interpretation. 
But at present we have no such model, and it is no easy task to identify thresh- 
old points for crises. 
The second explanation is that Swedish policy makers blundered  in their 
policy reforms. Financial market deregulation and tax reform would have im- 
proved the functioning of the economy but contributed instead to a real estate 
boom and bust and a dramatic increase in household savings. The Lindbeck et 
al. commission refers to “policy mistakes” in its report, blaming some combi- 
nation of  systems failure and policy mistakes for the crisis. Calmfors (1993, 
56) comes down more harshly on macroeconomic policy in particular, arguing 
that a “‘softer launching’ of non-accommodating policies . . .  would have been 
a much better strategy” than those that were adopted. 
The third explanation is that change per se has costs that economic analysts 
and policy makers typically understate. If Sweden had known no policy blun- 
ders-if  the government had done exactly what some all-knowing analyst had 
told it-there  still might have been a crisis. Swedish decision makers and insti- 
tutions had, after all, adapted to a particular economic system, and perhaps 
any change in the system was bound to create problems. It is plausible that a 
highly regulated welfare state economy is so tightly connected-a  “house of 
cards”-that  changes away from regulations, high benefits, and taxes etc. have 
greater short-run costs than in a more decentralized economy (Freeman 1995). 11  Introduction 
On this scenario, reform is costly in the near term, even if it is worthwhile as 
a long-term investment. 
We do not take a position with respect to these (possibly overlapping) expla- 
nations. While it is critical for some purposes to assess why the Swedish econ- 
omy went into a tailspin in the early 1990s and the extent to which the welfare 
state contributed to this, it is even more important to realize that the crisis has 
changed  the  basis  for the  Swedish welfare  state.  Sweden today  is a much 
poorer country than it would have been had its growth followed the normal 
OECD pattern in the 1990s. Swedish real GDP per capita is considerably be- 
low what it would have been; the public sector deficit is larger than it would 
have been and the rate of joblessness higher than under any noncrisis scenario. 
These facts in themselves  carry  an important message: they make it nearly 
impossible for the country to afford its traditional welfare state spending. The 
Swedish production  possibilities  frontier has shifted inward,  at least for the 
near term. 
A shrunken production  possibility  frontier raises different issues than the 
causes of  slackened growth. The issue for the  1990s is not only whether to 
reform the welfare state but also how to bring spending in line with a shrunken 
budget constraint in the most efficacious way, Those who believe that welfare 
spending and taxes did not cause Sweden’s economic woes face much the same 
constrained choice as those who believe that they did. Fewer resources mean 
smaller programs. In this circumstance, it is critical to determine the microeco- 
nomic costs and benefits of welfare state policies so that the government cuts 
in programs are least burdensome and so that socially desirable programs can 
be made to work more effectively. From this perspective, analyses of the sort 
undertaken in this NBER-SNS study of the workings of particular aspects of 
Sweden’s economy, of its welfare state programs, and of its interventionist poli- 
cies in product and labor markets can be particularly cogent in determining 
directions for policy reform. 
Summary of Findings 
Foreign economists have been invariably struck by several things about the 
Swedish economy: by the egalitarian wage and income distribution combined 
with low unemployment (until the 1990s); by the large public sector and the 
accompanying high tax burden; by the extent and generosity of income transfer 
programs; by the regulated and cartelized labor market; and by extensive labor 
market policies. They have also been struck by the fact that Sweden is a pros- 
perous country with virtually  no poverty but with high prices  for consumer 
goods. Finally, they have been struck by the fact that these outcomes are found 
in a country that is so highly exposed to international competition. 
The studies in the NBER-SNS project examined these aspects of the Swed- 
ish welfare state and economy by developing new data or analyses or by syn- 
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findings of  each study regarding these points. Because our project was  not 
designed to produce a single picture of the Swedish economy, the discerning 
reader may notice occasional disagreements among chapters in matters of em- 
phasis or interpretation. We regard these internal disagreements as a strength 
rather than a weakness of the book. Had we all agreed on everything, it would 
have been a sign that the project leaders had selected the wrong team or had 
created the wrong intellectual environment for individual analysts to “do their 
own thing.” 
The Welfare State 
The most important achievement of the Swedish welfare state is that it has 
succeeded in eliminating poverty. It has done this in part by creating one of the 
most egalitarian income distributions in the developed world. In the 1980s, the 
disposable income of households in the highest decile in Sweden was roughly 
twice as high as that of households in the lowest decile of the distribution. For 
comparison, top-decile incomes in the United States are about six times greater 
than those in the bottom decile. As a result, while the United States has a much 
higher (28 percent) real income per capita, poor Swedes have higher earnings 
than poor Americans: the incomes of  bottom-decile Swedes are 63 percent 
higher than those of bottom-decile Americans. 
Behind the extreme equalization of income in Sweden is a combination of 
more equal hourly pay, more equal employment (compared to other European 
countries), more equal distribution of hours of work for those who work (com- 
pared to the United States), and, last but not least, strongly equalizing taxes 
and transfers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the dispersion of factor incomes in Swe- 
den increased. Yet  the difference in disposable incomes decreased substan- 
tially. 
In chapter 1, Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman ask how raising the 
earnings and  income of  the  bottom parts  of  the  income distribution was 
achieved without creating a massive loss of jobs for the less skilled. The au- 
thors refute the argument that the egalitarian outcome can be attributed to an 
exceptionally homogeneous population: people of Swedish extraction living in 
the United States exhibit as much inequality as do other Americans, while 
people of foreign ancestry in Sweden have an income distribution comparable 
to that of  native Swedes. If  it is not the Swedes, then it must be the system. 
One possibility is that the system generates a more equal distribution of years 
of  schooling. This does not seem to be the case: the dispersion of  years of 
schooling in Sweden is actually larger than that in the United States. Another 
possibility is that, at lower levels of schooling, the quality of education in Swe- 
den is better than in the United States, producing less dispersion in school 
skills. Spending on education and test scores of students in Sweden are, in fact, 
less dispersed than in the United States. But the dispersion in test scores in 
Sweden is no smaller than in European countries that have failed to combine 
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egalitarian set of school outcomes cannot explain the Swedish success in com- 
bining a narrow wage distribution with high employment for so long. 
Who is willing to employ low-productivity workers at high wages? One an- 
swer has been the public sector. While the public sector has not employed a 
disproportionate  share of  low-paid workers, it has  employed an  increasing 
share of low-paid workers over time. Another, more speculative answer is that 
a compressed wage distribution has made able workers (within any given skill 
group) reduce their working time, which has increased the demand for less- 
able workers-work  sharing of  sorts. Who foots the bill? The taxpayers pay 
for the public sector, but consumers pay for the high wages of less-able workers 
through higher prices in the nontraded goods sector. 
A key question when the public sector has to reduce government spending 
is the effect of reductions in various programs on the distribution of income. 
Bjorklund and Freeman argue that, because Sweden has such a high “social 
safety net,” ongoing and potential reforms are no real threat to the egalitarian 
income distribution in Sweden, citing child allowances as the one possible ex- 
ception. Overall, the safety net is so high that reductions in spending are un- 
likely to cause real poverty or even a substantial rise in income inequality. 
Another important aspect of the Swedish welfare state is the public sector. 
The Swedish welfare state differs from other modem Western economies in 
that it has greatly enlarged the role of government in the provision of services, 
especially those that are traditionally produced in the household and family. 
All employment growth in Sweden since the early 1960s has been in services 
provided by the local government. And all of that growth has been in the in- 
creased employment of  women. Underlying this development has been  the 
rapid growth of publicly provided day care for preschool children. Employ- 
ment in public day care has grown explosively since the mid-1970s to be al- 
most half as large as employment in the education sector. An important reason 
for this is Swedish family policy. In 1991-92,  public expenditures for families 
with preschool children (parental leave, publicly provided day care, etc.) were 
almost 3.5 percent of GDP. This comes to about SKr 60,000 ($10,000 at that 
year’s exchange rate) per preschool child. 
In chapter 2, Sherwin Rosen raises the question whether this policy has been 
welfare enhancing. He notes that much of what is produced by Swedish women 
in the market is services (care of children and the aged) that the family pro- 
duces in many other countries. These services have economic value in those 
countries, even though this value is difficult to measure and is not counted in 
official estimates of GDP. This means that Sweden’s economic well-being is 
overstated  because  Sweden has  made  the  household  sector  a  part  of  the 
money economy. 
It is well known that taxes and subsidies distort individual decisions, which 
reduces overall economic welfare. We also know that tax-induced distortions 
in one sphere may  make other taxes or subsidies optimal for “second-best’’ 
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that there can be an efficiency gain from subsidizing the market work of par- 
ents of  young children through state-provided child care, which offsets the 
distortionary effect of high marginal tax rates on the decision to work in the 
(taxed) market sector. High marginal tax rates imply an implicit subsidy of 
(nontaxed) work in the home. Even so, it is not necessarily the case that subsid- 
ies increase efficiency. They reduce the distortion of the choice between stay- 
ing at home with one’s children and taking a market job. But the subsidy and 
the higher taxes required to finance it introduce a new distortion, lower prices 
for the subsidized goods, which produces an excessive consumption of  subsi- 
dized services and of other services that are produced through (nontaxed) work 
in the household. Under reasonable assumptions, Rosen shows that subsidies 
to day care in Sweden imply efficiency losses and that those losses are poten- 
tially large. Real living standards could be improved if the subsidies were re- 
duced  and  households  paid  for  more  of  these  services themselves in  the 
market. 
This analysis brings out an often neglected aspect of subsidies that offsets 
one distortion. They may readily create new and perhaps larger distortions. It 
is, to varying degrees, applicable to other Swedish welfare state policies. By 
creating a tax burden that is among the highest in the Western world, Sweden 
risks large efficiency losses. Successive tax reforms in the 1980s and the re- 
form in 1991 have reduced some of the distortions of economic decisions in- 
duced by  the old tax system. Yet, as long as government expenditures are as 
high as 60-70  percent of GDP, distortionary taxes risk large deadweight losses. 
In many cases, so do the transfer programs the taxes fund. The implication is 
that tax financing should be used only for programs whose social gains exceed 
budgetary costs, the deadweight loss from taxes, and the deadweight loss from 
the transfers. 
In chapter 3, Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. describe the distor- 
tions that the Swedish tax system created and show how these distortions have 
been reduced by  tax reforms. Sweden’s tax system prior to “great reform” in 
1991 was a hybrid of different principles of taxation. The reforms have moved 
the tax system closer to an “ideal” income tax system by (i) increasing unifor- 
mity and horizontal equity between households, (ii) reducing tax-induced dis- 
tortions of investment finance and kinds of investment, and (iii) broadening the 
tax base and lowering formal progressivity. However, it is important to recog- 
nize that, even in Sweden, formal progressivity did not correspond to actual 
progressivity since high-income earners could convert high-taxed  labor in- 
come to low-taxed capital income through deductions for interest payments. 
Strikingly, actual progressivity for a high-income earner was unchanged by 
the reforms. 
High progressive taxes can have a redistributive effect. But the redistribution 
goals of the welfare state have been increasingly realized through transfers to 
specific groups, where a substantial part is redistribution across an individual’s 
life. The tax system, too, has worked and still works in that way. Much prog- 15  Introduction 
ressivity occurs across age groups rather than across individuals with different 
lifetime earnings. Both the tax and the transfer systems thereby substitute for 
saving and insurance that individuals  could have arranged privately without 
the deadweight losses created by :axes. 
The authors note that, while the tax reforms (including abolishing double 
taxation of dividends) have not solved all Sweden’s tax-related problems, they 
have led to vast improvements. They have reduced the disincentives for market 
work and saving and should lead to a more rational allocation of the nation’s 
capital. The complexity of the system has been reduced. The perceived fairness 
of the system should improve markedly. Norman and McLure argue that these 
changes  should  be  safeguarded-especially  since  changes  in  themselves 
carry costs. 
The Labor Market 
The “Swedish model” in the labor market has two key elements. The first is 
centralized wage bargaining. The second is active labor market policies. In the 
1970s, this model was widely praised for contributing to Sweden’s high living 
standards, low income  inequality, and low unemployment.  Two  decades  of 
slow economic growth and the 1990s economic crisis with its record high un- 
employment and enormous government deficit have fueled doubts about the 
virtues of the Swedish labor market model. Critics argue that Sweden has pro- 
duced an ossified labor market that has reduced the country’s growth prospects. 
From the mid-1960s through the 1970s, wage and income inequality fell in 
Sweden along all observable dimensions (age and education groups, gender, 
etc.). This decline was larger and more rapid than what would have been gener- 
ated by market forces alone. In chapter 4, Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
explore the reasons for the decline in earnings inequality and examine how 
centralized wage bargaining helped Sweden maintain full employment for so 
long despite the strong narrowing of  wage differentials. 
It is important to note that the Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF) was 
the main initial proponent of centralized bargaining. Coordinated wage setting 
was seen as a method to prevent costly wage competition between unions. At 
the same time, coordinated wage setting was a precondition for the strongly 
egalitarian wage policies that the Swedish Trade Union Association (LO) came 
to pursue. For ideological reasons, the goal of this policy evolved, in the 1970s, 
from “equal pay for equal work” to just “equal pay.” 
Edin and Topel argue that a critical component of the centralized wage set- 
tlements was that wages for skilled workers were held down. Employers and 
unions joined forces to set a wage for skilled workers that was initially lower 
than their marginal product, creating excess demand for them. The argument is 
consistent with the constant “shortage of technicians” in Sweden. These wage 
contracts allowed employers in high-wage sectors to earn higher than normal 
profits.  Excess  profits  attracted  capital,  which  raised  the  demand  for both 
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the wages of unskilled workers rose. The result was wage compression and a 
movement of labor from low- to high-wage sectors of the economy. This was 
accomplished  without  creating  excess  supply  of  less-skilled  labor,  which 
would have shown up as unemployment. The “solidarity”  wage policy thus 
accomplished its objectives  in reducing  wage  differentials and maintaining 
full employment. 
The wage agreements implied a hidden income transfer from high- to low- 
wage workers. At the same time, the reduced skill differentials meant reduced 
incentives for workers to acquire skills. In the long run, this implies less invest- 
ment in human capital. Consistent with this, Edin and Topel show that college 
enrollment rates fell as the collegehigh school wage differential was reduced 
in the 1970s but subsequently rose with the returns to schooling in the 1980s. 
The authors warn that the imbalance therefore increases over time and increas- 
ingly undermines this kind of wage agreement. A complete breakdown of cen- 
tral bargaining would, according to this argument, lead to considerable widen- 
ing of wage differentials or, if this is not allowed to happen, unemployment for 
unskilled labor. Both, in fact, occurred in the 1990s. 
How do Swedes respond to wage compression, taxes, and transfers? If their 
economic decisions are not affected very much, perhaps the distortions created 
by  the welfare state and the labor market do not matter  very  much. A key 
question is how incentives affect labor supply. 
In chapter 5, Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker show how the welfare 
state gives a strong incentive for people to participate in the labor market be- 
cause benefits in most social programs are closely tied to market work. This 
contributes to high labor force participation in Sweden. But the welfare state 
also gives incentives to workers to limit hours worked and possibly effort as 
well. Econometric estimates on Swedish data show that male labor supply is 
not very responsive to changes in the net wage (after tax and benefits), but they 
do show responsiveness  by women. But Aronsson and Walker criticize these 
studies for being limited to the number of formal hours of work, which most 
individuals cannot freely vary. They argue that labor supply can respond along 
many other dimensions. When you allow for this, there is evidence that the 
Swedish welfare state has created strong disincentives to work. One example 
is how Swedes use generous state-provided sickness benefits, which the state 
has historically funded, giving both the firm and workers an incentive to exploit 
the system by reporting more sick days than they might under an alternative 
financing scheme. As a result of this incentive, the healthy Swedish population 
(which has one of the lowest mortality rates in the world) reported consider- 
ably more sick days than workers in other countries for many years. As part of 
its effort to reform the welfare state, Sweden toughened the rules for sickness 
benefits in the 1990s, which presumably explains a subsequent sharp drop in 
sickness leave. 
Labor supply can also adjust in a quality dimension. The willingness of indi- 
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economic incentives. As noted, rates of enrollment in higher education in Swe- 
den have varied  closely  with movements  in wage premia  to college-trained 
workers. The internal rate of return to college education declined throughout 
the 1970s until it was modest around 1980. After that it recovered, but through 
the mid-1990s it is still significantly below rates in the United States and most 
other advanced OECD countries. The implication is that Sweden would have 
had a much better-educated workforce in the 1990s had income differentials 
not been so compressed in the 1970s. 
The other important element of the Swedish model in the labor market has 
been Sweden’s active labor market policies. Many observers have argued that 
these policies are responsible for Sweden’s historically enviable unemployment 
experience. Total spending on government labor market programs, including 
unemployment compensation, was close to 3 percent of  GDP in Sweden in 
1990, with two-thirds  going for “active programs.”  By contrast, the United 
States spent 0.5 percent of GDP on all labor market programs in the same year. 
In 1993-94-when  unemployment was at a record high in Sweden-spending 
on all labor market programs rose to nearly 6 percent of GDP, with 2.9 percent 
of GDP going for the active programs that were supposed to keep unemploy- 
ment low. 
Whatever virtue they might have, active labor market policies did not pre- 
vent the dramatic rise in Swedish unemployment after 1990. The analysis of 
these policies by Anders Forslund and Alan B. Krueger in chapter 6 suggests 
that the inability of the active programs to arrest the growth of unemployment 
should not surprise us. They find that employment relief programs, which con- 
stitute a sizable share of the active programs, displaced private employment to 
a considerable extent, at least in the construction sector. In that sector, every 
public relief worker displaces up to 0.7 regular jobs. Displacement is less clear 
for health and welfare workers in the public sector. Forslund and Krueger also 
review micro studies of Swedish training programs that show that the returns 
on these programs do not readily justify their costs. The rate of return on a 
training program depends on the effect of training on future earnings and the 
probability of getting a new job. To motivate the programs, the rate of return 
generated  from  higher  future  earnings  should  be  at  least  3 percent.  The 
weighted average of estimated rates of return from extant studies suggests that 
the payoff is well below 3 percent. In fact, one can question whether the pro- 
grams have had any effect at all. 
International comparisons using 1980s data have shown a negative relation 
between unemployment and spending on labor market policies. This has given 
some observers a favorable impression of Sweden’s labor market policies. Fors- 
lund and Krueger  show that the relation does not hold in the  1990s. Indeed, 
the same analysis for 1993 shows a positive relation: the larger such expendi- 
tures, the higher the rate of unemployment! This finding suggests that the ear- 
lier cross-country result was not robust and is likely to have been a statistical 
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Although the results are discouraging, they are consistent with American 
studies of job market programs (which often involve random assignment of 
people to programs in an experimental design). The U.S. studies show that, at 
their best, these programs have modest positive effects on the employment and 
earnings of participants but are no panacea to joblessness (US. Department of 
Labor 1995). The evidence that Swedish labor market programs have, at best, 
similar marginal returns suggests that the extensive allocation of resources to 
the programs merits  serious reevaluation.  Sweden’s low precrisis unemploy- 
ment rate was not the result of  labor market policies, and those policies did 
little to arrest the increase in unemployment during the early 1990s crisis. 
Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent explore the unemployment  issue 
from a different direction in chapter 7, which deals with the role of  taxes and 
transfers in unemployment. Their analysis, based on a simulation model, shows 
how Swedish taxes, in combination with unemployment insurance, affect effi- 
ciency  and  unemployment.  They  emphasize  “search  unemployment,”  the 
amount of  time workers spend searching for a job, and “reservation  wages,” 
the lower limit of  wage offers that an unemployed  worker will accept. The 
reservation wage increases when unemployment compensation is more gener- 
ous, which increases search unemployment as well. Many empirical studies 
show this effect; the longer people are eligible for unemployment compensa- 
tion, the longer they remain jobless.  When unemployment benefits run out, 
there is invariably a spike in the job-finding rate. 
Until the 1990s crisis, Sweden combined generous unemployment compen- 
sation with low unemployment, in contrast to the experience of most European 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. One reason for this, according to Ljungqvist 
and Sargent, was the narrow distribution of wages and the progressive tax and 
benefit system, which reduced the return to searching for a job while unem- 
ployed. In a country like the United States, it pays to search more than it does 
in Sweden because rates of pay vary more across employers. Another reason 
was that labor market officials could legitimately press the unemployed to take 
available jobs: after all, the jobs were there. 
But the Swedish policy had a cost. Less job search means that individuals 
are less likely to be employed in their most productive job. The “tax wedge” 
therefore reduces total output. Note that the narrow wage dispersion in Sweden 
also reduces search and thus lowers unemployment at the cost of efficiency. 
The analysis also suggests that the  1990s jump in unemployment  in Sweden 
will not readily be reduced. The reason is both generous unemployment com- 
pensation and the fact that it is more difficult to enforce the requirement of job 
acceptance in a situation with high unemployment. And greater wage inequal- 
ity raises the equilibrium rate of search unemployment. 
Product Markets and Firm Size 
Welfare state policies and the institutions in the labor market affect produc- 
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whether Sweden’s product markets are more regulated than markets in other 
countries or whether  its regulatory policies  are more distortionary. What is 
clear, however, is that Sweden has had a more lax attitude toward cartels and 
other barriers to competition than other countries and that these barriers often 
endure because of  supporting regulations. To Americans schooled in antitrust 
policy, it is particularly  surprising that until recently  Sweden allowed cartels 
among producers and even kept a public record of  them. Stefan Folster and 
Sam Peltzman make use of this fact in their analysis in chapter 8, where they 
explore the effect of weak competition and regulations on Swedish prices. 
Sweden is a high-price country. In 1990, OECD data show that Sweden had 
the second highest price level of all OECD countries when GDP per capita is 
taken into account. The United States had the lowest. After the large deprecia- 
tion of  the krona in  1992, Sweden still had the fifth highest cost level. One 
reason for this is Sweden’s high value added tax. Another reason is the high 
wages of unskilled labor in the service sector. A third reason is, as Folster and 
Peltzman show, lack of competition and regulatory policies. 
Even though Folster and Peltzman restrict their analysis to the traded goods 
sector, they find evidence that weak competition contributes to high product 
prices in the Swedish market, with regulations playing a larger role than cartels 
by themselves. Without the support of regulation, many cartels would not sur- 
vive. Folster and Peltzman estimate that interventions in product markets have 
raised  Swedish prices  and reduced productivity  and growth. These findings 
suggest that monopoly profits in cartelized industries have been dissipated in 
higher costs. Although Swedish antitrust policy became more restrictive when 
the government brought it in line with European  Union policy, informal re- 
straints may continue to affect competition. In pursuing a more restrictive anti- 
trust policy, the authors suggest that numerical measures of concentration may 
be a misleading guide to policy. Firms often grow large because they are more 
efficient than competitors. Removing institutional obstacles to entry (including 
imports) and regulatory restraints on competition merits higher priority. 
An important but little researched question is how a welfare state like Swe- 
den’s affects entrepreneurial activity and the birth of new firms. Some econo- 
mists have argued that, by providing a high safety net for entrepreneurs who 
fail, a large welfare state should encourage risky entrepreneurial activity (Sinn 
1995). But high and distortionary taxes, high wages, and cost-increasing regu- 
lations and cartels will create disincentives for start-up and  small firms. In 
chapter 9, Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson find that Swedish policies 
have in fact discriminated against new,  small, and labor-intensive  firms and 
against family-owned firms as well. High statutory tax rates on corporations 
(especially prior to tax reform) coupled with deductions for investments trans- 
lated into low effective taxes for older, capital intensive firms with accumu- 
lated profits. The tax system also favored institutional ownership at the expense 
of family-owned firms. The system of credit rationing prior to the deregulation 
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well. Centralized wage bargaining, which eliminated the relation between size 
of firm and pay, and high employment security increased costs for new firms. 
Finally, the public sector monopoly in many service activities removed private 
entrepreneurs from a large and growing sector of the economy. 
Presumably in part as a result of these policies, Sweden has disproportion- 
ately few small firms, and Swedish industry is more dominated by very large 
firms than the United States. Davis and Henrekson find that the industrial dis- 
tribution of Swedish employment is tilted away from industries that typically 
support small firms. Even within manufacturing, Sweden has a larger share of 
jobs in industries dominated by large firms than the United States. In addition, 
Sweden  has  relatively  few  workers  in  low-wage  industries  and  more  in 
medium-wage industries. The implication is that Sweden’s policy of wage com- 
pression has accomplished one of its avowed purposes, eliminating many low- 
wage jobs, consistent with Edin and Topel’s analysis in chapter 4. The costs of 
such a policy might be low during an era of full employment and rapid eco- 
nomic growth, but, during a period of high unemployment,  such policies can 
be costly. Davis and Henrekson conclude that policies discriminating against 
smaller, owner-operated enterprises and new entrepreneurs are a potentially 
sizable drag on the Swedish economy. Some goods and services are likely to 
be more efficiently produced by small firms, but these firms are “crowded out” 
of the product market by government services or larger firms. Given the shift in 
employment from goods-producing to service-producing industries, Swedish 
policies could be a serious hindrance to the expansion of jobs and recovery 
from the 1990s crisis. 
The International Economy 
Sweden is a small open economy, highly dependent on the outside world. In 
chapter 10, Edward E. Learner and Per Lundborg describe how the world eco- 
nomic environment affects Sweden and its welfare state. Factors of production, 
especially financial capital and knowledge capital, are internationally  mobile, 
and manufactured goods are traded internationally. Learner and Lundborg ar- 
gue that part of  Sweden’s laggard growth in recent decades can be explained 
by the interaction between the welfare state and changes in the global market- 
place. 
The starting point for Learner and Lundborg’s analysis is that gains from 
trade accme especially to countries whose mixes of productive factors are very 
different from the rest  of  the world.  In the  1950s and  1960s, Sweden was 
uniquely endowed with both physical and human capital. It experienced large 
gains from international trade. Subsequently, Sweden had a lower rate of in- 
vestment  in both physical  and human capital than other countries, which- 
according to earlier chapters-can  at least be partly attributed to Sweden’s re- 
distributive policies. Sweden’s  mix of  factor supplies became less distinct as 
other countries have caught up in the 1980s. On one side, Sweden was crowded 
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compete in products where Sweden used to have a comparative advantage, that 
is, in capital intensive products.  On the other side, Sweden was crowded by 
poorer countries competing in production that uses relatively large amounts of 
unskilled labor at wage rates that are unconscionable from a Swedish stand- 
point. 
A lower rate of capital accumulation and increased competition can account 
for Sweden’s  slower growth and lost market shares since 1970. Learner and 
Lundborg warn that economic liberalization in Asia, South America, and East- 
em Europe has meant a dramatic increase in the supply of unskilled workers 
in the global economy, putting pressure on lower wages for unskilled workers 
and higher compensation for scarce talents. While Sweden seeks to maintain 
narrow wage differentials, the international market is dictating increased dif- 
ferentials. They also note that Sweden’s strong comparative advantage in forest 
resource products means that relatively much physical capital is absorbed in 
the capital intensive forest sector, making the country’s endowment in forest 
resources a mixed blessing: it contributes to national income but necessitates 
a high rate of investment, which can reduce investment elsewhere to the extent 
that international capital mobility is imperfect. 
Looking into the future, Lundborg and Learner conclude that, unless Swe- 
den restores its position  as a country relatively well endowed with physical 
capital and skilled workers,  Swedish workers  will find themselves  in direct 
competition  with  low-wage,  low-skill  workers  in  the  international  market- 
place. If, on the other hand, Sweden is able to resume its position as a relatively 
capital rich country, it will find that the gains from increased trade will  be 
broadly shared within the country. In order to have high and relatively egalitar- 
ian earnings in the future, Sweden must invest in human capital, specialize in 
human capital intensive tradable goods, and abandon low-skill tradable goods, 
whose relative price in world markets will be determined by low-wage coun- 
tries. The dilemma of the Swedish welfare state is that, in order to increase 
investments in human capital and maintain high incomes and a relatively egali- 
tarian distribution  as well as to finance a higher social safety net in the long 
run, Sweden may have to accept greater income inequality in the short run. 
Through a Glass Darkly: Sweden’s Welfare State and Its Economy as 
a Whole 
From an outsider’s perspective, there are four great puzzles in interpreting 
Sweden’s experience with the welfare state and its supportive economy. The 
first is how, until the 1990s crisis, Sweden maintained a narrow wage structure 
with high employment for so long. Why did wage compression fail to create 
an unemployment  problem for low-skill workers, of  the type found in many 
other European countries in the 1980s?  If the United States were to double its 
minimum wage to bring the bottom tier of employees as close to the median 
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ployment effect of the U.S. minimum or proposed by advocates of a higher 
U.S. minimum), the consequences for employment would surely be serious. 
The second puzzle is how, with such a high tax and benefits system, Sweden 
avoided a supply-side incentive crisis: why did the welfare state-induced  gap 
between market activity  and consumption not destroy  the work ethic of the 
ordinary citizen and lock the poor into a welfare trap? With much lower wel- 
fare benefits, the United States created a system in which many of the poor are 
caught in a bind, with such high effective marginal taxes (via loss of benefits) 
that it barely pays them to work. 
Both these puzzles reflect the economist’s surprise that the Swedish econ- 
omy worked as well as it did. Mancur Olson found his answer in Sweden’s 
being a small open economy that had to meet international competition and in 
the all-encompassing nature of the union movement (Olson 1990).  The Swed- 
ish debate over just how the economy performed prior to the 1990s crisis offers 
an alternative perspective, with the claim that the economy was not so success- 
ful after all. 
The third puzzle, which is especially poignant to Americans who see home- 
lessness and urban blight in virtually all cities, is how Sweden’s welfare state 
conquered poverty. If the Great Society War on Poverty in the United States 
had succeeded in its lofty goals, opposition to welfare state expenditures in the 
United States would surely be  seriously  tempered. But that war failed. The 
success of Swedish policies seems to have produced a very different debate 
over welfare spending than that in the United States, with conservative Swedes 
as well as Social Democrats supporting the basic precepts of the welfare state. 
The fourth puzzle,  referred to earlier, is why the Swedish economy  went 
“over the brink” in the 1990s. What is it about the welfare state and the Swed- 
ish economy that produced a fall in real output at just the time of real reform? 
The late 1980s, early 1990s changes in the tax system, in wage setting, in the 
rules for benefits, in the regulation of markets, should have increased economic 
efficiency. But these reforms did not prevent a major economic downturn. 
As noted, our project was not designed to develop a single model or theme 
to address these “big” puzzles. Some unifying themes, however, emerge from 
the studies that offer answers. 
Sweden as an Interrelated System 
The first unifying theme is that many aspects of the Swedish welfare state 
and economy fit together in a systemic way.  Low unemployment, high taxes, 
wage compression, high labor participation with limited hours of work, subsi- 
dized day care, etc. reinforce one another in sometimes surprising ways. Using 
a wide variety of  analytic methods, the authors in this volume have stressed 
the linkages among welfare and economic policies in what we will call the 
logic of the “welfare state system.” 
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ment. The compressed wage structure was associated with effectively constant 
private sector employment. This made public sector employment growth the 
necessary engine for full employment. Such growth required in turn high taxa- 
tion and a reasonably  efficient public sector to deliver services that citizens 
want.  The  high  taxes  themselves  arguably  feed  back  onto  the  wage- 
determining process, making it easier for high-skill workers to accept wage 
compression: after all, much of a wage increase would be lost in progressive 
taxes. 
The research in this volume also points to several other effects of wage com- 
pression on the supply and demand sides of the labor market that buttress em- 
ployment rather than work against full employment. On the supply side, com- 
pression  lowers  search  unemployment:  with  little  wage  variation  in  the 
economy, people have little incentive to search for the best-paying job. Com- 
pression, highly progressive taxes, and welfare benefits work together to re- 
duce the incentive to work long hours and arguably fueled the desire for addi- 
tional vacation and holiday time. 
On the demand side, the limited hours worked by many Swedes may have 
raised the demand for employees through a form of implicit work sharing. For 
a period of time, wage compression helped expand high-wage traded goods 
industries by providing them with less-expensive high-skill workers and but- 
tressed demand for the less skilled in those sectors. In addition, wage compres- 
sion affects the distribution of industrial employment and the size distribution 
of establishments. Eliminating low-wage sectors and firms makes it easier to 
maintain  a  narrow  wage  distribution.  Compression  also  affected  the  price 
level: if low-skill workers are paid relatively high wages, the goods they pro- 
duce will be high-priced goods. Even industrial regulation, with legal cartels, 
has a logic in this analysis, making it easier to maintain the high prices neces- 
sary for the high wages. 
In short, many of the issues dealt with in this project link together, some in 
expected ways, others in unexpected ways, to resolve the wage compression- 
low unemployment puzzle. 
As to Sweden’s avoidance of welfare poverty traps, the basic answer, stressed 
in various ways by several researchers, is that most Swedish welfare programs 
are workfare programs, requiring some labor participation before people re- 
ceive benefits or as a condition for receiving the benefits. Although not actuari- 
ally balanced, most Swedish welfare benefits are sufficiently work related that 
the term workfare state is arguably a more appropriate appellation for Sweden 
than welfare state. High taxation of wages that might otherwise induce people 
to stay out of the labor market is offset by benefits attached to work. Parents 
benefit through subsidies for child care. Other workers benefit through gener- 
ous sick leave and vacation and holiday pay. By making these and other bene- 
fits conditional  on work,  Sweden limits tax-related work  disincentives.  By 
conditioning benefits on a limited amount of  work rather than making them 
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support the low hours or work sharing that characterizes the Swedish employ- 
ment record. 
Taken together, the wage compression, high employment, and work-related 
welfare system enabled Sweden to make the redistributions  necessary for a 
successful war on poverty. But it did not avoid supply-side disincentives. 
With a compressed  wage  structure, a person  with a job is part of normal 
society. By contrast, in the United States, with highly dispersed wages, many 
hold jobs that pay so little that they fall into an economic and social underclass. 
The high rate of  employment  in  Sweden meant that  society could  pressure 
people on unemployment insurance to take jobs, which existed. It is difficult 
to imagine how Sweden could have operated such an extensive welfare system 
absent  the welfare benefit-work  linkage. All  these factors-along  with the 
magnitude  of  government  redistributive  spending-enabled  Sweden to con- 
quer poverty while the wealthier United States failed to do so. 
In sum, our research portrays Sweden as having a highly interrelated welfare 
state and economy in which many parts fit together-be  they subsidies, taxes, 
collective bargaining,  or wage  compression-in  ways  that  maintained  high 
employment  and wage  compression,  helped offset  work  disincentives from 
welfare benefits, and ultimately helped eliminate poverty. To say that parts of 
the Swedish welfare state and economy fit together in a systemic way does not, 
of course, mean that the fit resulted from some farsighted social engineering. 
More probably, it is the result of adaptation, as the government, business, con- 
sumers, workers, and unions each adjusted their behavior to that of  the others. 
Once certain policies were in place, others followed naturally, until things fit 
together. To  say that  Sweden developed  a distinct welfare  state system also 
does not  mean that all policies  or programs  were  consistent  or supportive, 
much less sustainable. 
Viewing Sweden as a system is not, of course, new; virtually all discussions 
of the Swedish model or the Swedish way have a systemic flavor. But the di- 
verse microeconomic links that make this welfare state and economy so inter- 
connected have not previously been so fully drawn out, nor have so many of 
the separate links been developed in detail. 
The picture of the Swedish welfare state and economy as a tightly connected 
system that emerges from our study suggests, finally, an interpretation of Swe- 
den’s  1990s problems and of the difficulties it may have overcoming them. If 
Swedish economic and political  agents were fully  adapted  to the advanced 
welfare state prior to the 1990s,  ensuing changes in the economic environment, 
particularly in the world marketplace, and welfare state reforms would almost 
by  necessity be quite costly, as those agents adjusted to new incentives and 
market conditions. The analogy is with fitness landscapes in evolutionary the- 
ory-a  terrain of peaks and valleys, in which creatures (societies) move to new 
mountain peaks only by  descending from an existing peak (Freeman 1995). 
No single reform or policy can turn around a complex interrelated system in a 
short time span. 25  Introduction 
Costs of the Welfare State 
The other theme that emerges from our study is that the costs of the Swedish 
welfare state have been high, both in budgetary expenses and in hidden eco- 
nomic costs due to deadweight or distortionary losses induced by taxes or ben- 
efits, and that some programs have not contributed to the society’s great success 
in reducing poverty. 
Sweden did not eliminate poverty by “magic.” It paid a price, in the form of 
taxes and the loss of output owing to distortions. In the first instance, Sweden 
pays for its welfare benefits through taxes or public sector deficits. In the di- 
minished  economy of  the  1990s, the government  share of  GDP reached 70 
percent in 1993, accompanied by a sufficiently high deficit to produce a rapidly 
rising public debt/GDP ratio. This is unsustainable by itself. But Sweden also 
pays indirectly for its welfare benefits through deadweight losses in output as 
people respond to the incentives created by taxes and benefits. As noted, some 
taxes and benefits  offset one another, keeping  distortionary losses low.  But 
other taxes and benefits are not offsetting, and, in a society with high tax rates 
and benefits,  they can produce  sizable distortions, even if they induce only 
modest responses. 
The magnitude of the deadweight losses is difficult to assess. Estimates of 
deadweight losses due to taxes based solely on labor supply responses are as 
high as 40 percent for the period prior to the tax reforms and lower afterward. 
Other estimates are lower. But these estimates are limited to only a single di- 
mension of responsiveness (hours worked) and thus may be lower-bound esti- 
mates of the labor supply reaction. For instance, they neglect the possible long- 
term consequences of high taxes and benefits for human capital formation. In 
a tightly  connected  system, moreover, partial  equilibrium  analyses  of  dead- 
weight losses can be misleading.  Much larger estimates have been made in 
models that seek to bring  in additional economic responses, although these 
models and estimates are best viewed as illustrative: computable general equi- 
librium models are as much art as science. 
The appropriate analytic tool for comparing the benefits of Sweden’s welfare 
state programs and their costs is some form of benefitlcost analysis. For pro- 
grams that require tax or deficit financing, the excess burden of  taxation and 
the possible  adverse effects of deficits on investment and long-term growth 
imply that the cost of any program exceeds its budget cost. With an estimated 
excess burden of taxes of 40 percent, for instance, a program is socially justifi- 
able only if its benefits exceed budget costs by 1.40/1.00. In a period of huge 
public  sector  deficit,  the  appropriate  benefitkost ratio  would  probably  be 
even higher. 
The benefit  side of  programs must be examined by  comparing outcomes 
with and without the programs or at different program levels. If the programs 
induce distortions in response to benefits or other spending, as they invariably 
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it is easy to assume that popular welfare state programs necessarily  generate 
substantial social benefits (why else would they be popular?), or perhaps be- 
cause economists are more cost conscious than politicians, economic science 
offers very few estimates of the benefits of social programs. For instance, we 
have reasonable ideas about the direct and indirect costs of unemployment in- 
surance systems but no real evidence on the value of such insurance to employ- 
ees. Absent  evidence of  substantial benefits,  one can legitimately  question 
whether even  politically  sensitive  programs  could  pass  the  proper  benefit/ 
costs test. 
Implications and Lessons 
What are the implications of our research for Sweden’s efforts to reform its 
welfare state and reestablish a healthy economy? What can the United States 
and other countries with less extensive welfare states learn from the Swedish 
experience? 
Implications for Swedish Reforms 
Following its 1990s economic crisis, Sweden faces three major problems: 
lowering the rate of unemployment; reducing the government budget deficit; 
and attaining a new long-term growth path. It is only by solving these problems 
that Sweden will be able to achieve a healthy economy and welfare state. 
With respect to reducing unemployment, our research has one strong mes- 
sage: active labor market programs, which have cost the society some 3 percent 
of GDP directly, do not appear to repay such extensive expenditures. Extant 
studies of programs do not yield the magnitude of returns that would justify 
such a high level of  spending. With respect to “passive programs”-notably 
unemployment insurance-the  general finding is that, the longer the benefits 
are available, the longer will be spells of unemployment. The social controls 
that Sweden has used to limit this distortionary response are likely to weaken 
in a period of extended high unemployment. This suggests that the generous 
Swedish unemployment insurance system-possibly  suitable for a period of 
low unemployment-may  be unsuitable for an era of high joblessness. 
Given the state of Sweden’s public finances  and the high  public share of 
employment, the solution to unemployment must rest with private sector job 
creation. Increased wage differences for groups with different qualifications 
can potentially contribute to this, by inducing the less skilled to obtain greater 
skills and by  reducing  the cost of low-skilled labor, particularly  for private 
service sector jobs. Sweden offers special subsidies to employ youths.  Our 
analysis suggests that marginal wage subsidies paid out of the public budget 
have greater costs than their budget value and thus should be compared criti- 
cally to the alternative of greater wage differentials. By contrast, search unem- 
ployment  arguments support the  long-standing Swedish goal of  similar pay 
for similarly skilled workers in comparable circumstances. This form of pay 27  Introduction 
equalization can reduce unemployment. Equal pay for equal work is a valid 
principle that is supported by market forces-the  law of one price-although 
there are problems with determining what equal pay means in a world with 
heterogeneous nonwage working conditions. 
Sweden’s fiscal deficit in the early 1990s dwarfs the American deficit (and 
those of virtually all other OECD countries). Reducing the Swedish deficit- 
fueled by unemployment and reduced GDP-necessitates  a contraction of the 
welfare state. While it would be soothing to report that recovery from the de- 
pression would in itself cure the deficit problem, this does not appear to be the 
case. The scale of cuts in programs or increases in taxes needed to restore fiscal 
solvency is large. The greater the rate of growth and the faster unemployment 
can be reduced, the  smaller will be the required  squeezing of  programs or 
taxpayers. But the costless solution to fiscal woes-“grow  the economy”-is 
even less practical  than usual. Sweden’s problems will not be solved simply 
through growth, even if growth reduces unemployment. Contraction of welfare 
spending is a budget necessity, not a matter of political philosophy. 
Our analysis suggests that reductions in spending programs can have a dou- 
ble benefit, cutting both direct budget expenses and indirect deadweight losses. 
It also suggests that the benefits of some programs (e.g., the active labor market 
spending) may not justify  the  magnitude of  these expenditures and that the 
indirect costs of  other programs (e.g.. subsidised day care) may also call for 
cutbacks. We  also find that reductions  in  some programs will not seriously 
affect the income distribution (unemployment insurance) while reductions in 
others will (child allowances). At the same time, our analysis also suggests the 
danger of reducing programs  or increasing taxes when those programsftaxes 
offset the distortionary effects of other programs/taxes. 
On the growth front, many of our studies stressed the importance of  addi- 
tional human  capital formation, through enrollments in universities  and pre- 
sumably through training workers with a given level of education within firms 
as well, and the need for greater earnings differentials to induce such invest- 
ments. The tax disincentives that have discouraged the formation of small firms 
have been reduced and can be further reduced to make it easier to form new 
businesses. Reduced distortions of taxes on capital should help produce the 
greater investment that is needed to maintain Sweden on a new steady growth 
path. Over the long run, Sweden will have to move toward a more human and 
physical capital intensive society if it wants to maintain high wages and living 
standards for less-skilled workers. The implicit message in these results is that 
many features of the Swedish model were not sustainable over the long run. 
A Short Postmortem 
Since the completion of our project, the Swedish economy has made some 
progress in getting itself back on track, and policy makers have tried valiantly 
to restore the government’s financial balance.  In  1994 and  1995, economic 
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devalued currency. But the rates of growth are such as to confirm our conclu- 
sion that  Sweden suffered a permanent  loss in  its economic well-being. In 
1995, Sweden roughly recovered  the level of real GDP it had in  1990. The 
government deficit fell from its extraordinary 13 percent of GDP level in 1993 
to below 8 percent in 1995 and is forecast to drop to 2 percent of GDP by 1997. 
This improvement has been achieved mainly through recovery of revenues as 
a result of  economic growth, increases in taxes, and a general squeezing of 
programs that has included reductions in replacement rates for various social 
insurance programs.  Despite increased interest payments on a rising  public 
debt, the rate of government expenditures over GDP has fallen. 
These developments have moved Sweden “out of the ditch,” but, as of this 
writing, we do not believe that they have gone far enough to bring the economy 
into a safe zone, where the successes of the welfare state are sufficiently pro- 
tected from possible adverse economic developments. Unemployment remains 
high, in double digits when those on labor market programs are included in 
the jobless total. Sweden appears to have fallen into the European Union posi- 
tion of high and possibly long-duration unemployment, which will make long- 
term demands on public spending for unemployment insurance or other safety 
net programs. 
Our work suggests that there is still room for a major squeezing of programs 
before Sweden will risk endangering its conquest of poverty. Low-wage work- 
ers are not low wage by U.S. standards. Two-earner families provide an im- 
portant form of private income insurance. All Swedes receive a significant pro- 
portion of their income in the form of  social income that is not part of  their 
personal earnings. And, finally, some welfare state programs are either nonre- 
distributive  or not particularly  effective. Deeper analyses of  these programs 
than we could undertake would provide better evidence on the most effective 
ways of cutting spending. 
The greatest danger to Sweden’s welfare state and its elimination of poverty 
is not sizable cuts in program expenditures to restore fiscal balance but modest 
cuts that leave the country liable to another economic crisis if Sweden falls 
into another major recession. The government budget balance in a country with 
as high a level of public spending as Sweden and significant welfare state com- 
mittments to its citizens is extremely sensitive to cyclic changes in the econ- 
omy. Sweden’s welfare state may therefore be best served by establishing “clear 
blue water” between its budget and potential renewed deficits in the next eco- 
nomic downturn. This may in turn require a healthy surplus in government 
finances in booming times so that Sweden can run moderate deficits in reces- 
sions. 
Lessons for the United States and Other Countries 
The Swedish experience holds lessons for the United States and other coun- 
tries that have less-extensive welfare states. While Sweden can no longer real- 29  Introduction 
istically  serve as the  “third way” role model that it once did, its  success in 
eliminating poverty still merits attention, and its problems with a large welfare 
state offer warnings to other countries. 
On the positive side, the fact that Sweden succeeded in abolishing poverty 
through a welfare system that encouraged work and went further than neces- 
sary to accomplish that goal offers hope that other countries, such as the United 
States, can also significantly reduce poverty and can do so without buying into 
the “third way.” At its best, Sweden’s welfare system is a workfare system that 
has avoided creating major poverty traps. Low earners in Sweden gain social 
benefits by working. The lesson we draw is that welfare and work need not be 
antithetical. By attaching many benefits to work, welfare can be used to draw 
people into the job market and into the mainstream of society. 
That much of  Sweden’s welfare state went beyond what was necessary  to 
eliminate poverty is also heartening to outsiders, particularly to Americans, for 
whom a large welfare state is virtually inconceivable. While our study did not 
attempt to estimate the magnitude of welfare state benefits or the specific pro- 
grams necessary to reduce poverty massively, the share of GDP so needed is 
arguably far below the size of the Swedish welfare state. 
Sweden’s ongoing welfare state reforms show, further, that it is possible to 
start reducing a large welfare state (albeit under a financial gun) without de- 
stroying the social consensus favoring that state and its successes. The fact that 
many of the Swedish reforms, such as the tax reforms reviewed in chapter 4, 
were initiated by Social Democratic proponents of the welfare state and that 
more conservative Swedes calling for greater reforms have done so with the 
avowed purpose of preserving the welfare state is in stark contrast to political 
rhetoric  in the United  States. The American economists on the NBER-SNS 
project were continually impressed by the commitment of Swedes of all politi- 
cal persuasions to maintaining the successful elimination of poverty. 
Since Sweden did fall into the “ditch,” however, it is on the warning  side 
that we draw more lessons-in  this case, more for other European countries 
with large welfare states of their own than for the United States, where policies 
have gone in a very different direction. 
The first warning is that the high level of public spending and taxation in a 
large welfare state like Sweden may be dysfunctional in the world of low eco- 
nomic growth rates and high joblessness that has characterized OECD Europe 
since the early 1980s. The danger to which Sweden’s experience should alert 
others is that a severe economic downturn can quickly create massive public 
sector deficits, constrain policies that might spark a recovery, and force reduc- 
tions in social safety programs. Generous Unemployment insurance and labor 
market programs may become counterproductive if the economy falls into high 
unemployment. 
The second warning is that the two distinctive aspects of the Swedish labor 
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appear anywhere near as desirable as their proponents have suggested. Central- 
ized wage bargaining did not guarantee low inflation. And it produced wage 
compressions that arguably distorted investments in human capital and the in- 
dustrial composition of employment. The benefits of centralized bargaining 
may exceed their costs in some situations, but Sweden is far from an exemplar 
in this respect. As for active labor market programs,  our team was surprised 
that such a widely publicized and expensive set of programs did not seem to 
have much payoff. It is now clear that unemployment cannot be cured by pour- 
ing money into active programs. 
The third warning is that one must go beyond the direct costs of  welfare 
state programs to make a rational assessment of their value. One must look at 
the “true” social costs, including the deadweight losses due to both taxes and 
benefits. While, in some instances, second-best solutions in which the distor- 
tionary incentives of one program are offset by another may be justified, there 
is danger that this strategy will create other distortions; see the chapter 3 analy- 
sis of subsidized child care. 
The fourth warning  is that economic reforms in a large welfare state are 
likely to extract a sizable short-run economic cost. No one in Sweden antici- 
pated that the country would veer into an economic ditch as it was reforming 
its tax system and financial market regulations. There were unintended conse- 
quences of Sweden’s policy changes, some arguably due to the sequencing of 
reforms, others due to policy makers’ and analysts’ lack of foresight. In a com- 
plex economy, one cannot be sure on which margins firms, consumers, unions, 
and government agencies may make adjustments, with feedback for other deci- 
sion makers. 
The Swedish Model and the U.S. Model 
Since the end of World War 11, many non-Swedish social scientists, often 
with  a  leftist  bent,  have viewed  Sweden  as some form of  social paradise. 
Swedes were seen as civilized collectivists afflicted by none of the economic 
problems of the rest of the world. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, many non-American social scientists, often with a 
rightist bent, viewed the United States as some form of  neoclassical market 
paradise. Americans were seen as hard-working individualists with none of the 
employment woes of the rest of  the West. Sweden and the United States were 
widely  viewed  as polar opposites in the garden of  capitalist economies: the 
extreme welfare state versus the extreme free market state. 
Neither the image of Sweden as the ideal welfare state nor that of the United 
States as the ideal market economy was or is valid. Both our societies had and 
have major problems. But both the problems and the ways the two countries 
have tried to deal with them differ enough to give Americans a unique perspec- 
tive on the Swedish situation-a  perspective that offers both insights and pos- 
sibly misreadings-as  would Swedes presumably have on the American situa- 31  Introduction 
tion. While our study does not undertake this mirror analysis of  looking at the 
United States through Swedish eyes (as Gunnar Myrdal did in the 1940s), we 
hope that what we found out about Sweden adds to our understanding of how 
the United States operates, as well. 
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